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First World priorities and the need for nations to coexist in harmony
have given rise in each period to a set of rules constituting the
international economic order. This is a shifting order, in which national
goals move alternatively towards and away from those of an international
nature. The objective of the gold standard was to uphold monetary
convertibility, if necessary at the expense of national objectives. By
contrast, the Bretton Woods system inverted the terms of the equation by
making governments responsible for employment and growth. The
monetary pendulum is now swinging back again, from nationalism to
cosmopolitanism. In the case of Mexico, owing to failures of adaptation,
this latest shift has translated into an all-out struggle against inflation that
has brought the country to a state of chronic near-stagnation, leaving it
trailing in the rear of the world development process.
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National policies have been conditioned to varying
degrees by economic paradigms, the dominant outlook
of the first World and the unavoidable need to organize
the world economy around a set of rules that must be
complied with if nations are to coexist in harmony. Of
course, any international order will be subject to
conflicts and to asymmetries in compliance;
nonetheless, the advantages of joining this order or the
disadvantages of staying outside it are particularly
intense for peripheral countries.
An essential part of the economic arrangements
among nations are the monetary and currency regimes
that underpin reciprocal transactions. The abolition of
frontiers, the emergence of new economies of world
importance and the technological revolution have made
change indispensable and agreements much more
complicated to reach.
Since the introduction of the gold standard,
monetary regimes have been influenced by ideological
factors serving to explain, rationalize and implement
the distribution of benefits, costs and responsibilities
in each world economic order.
This article aims to provide a brief review of the
historical swings in the monetary pendulum, emphasizing
movements that have opened and narrowed the gap
between purely national goals and those of a cosmopolitan
nature. The consequences of these movements for
development are significant, and they show how
completely factors of an ideological nature have become
intertwined with the economic life of nations.
II
From the gold standard to Bretton Woods
Although they may be masked, it is possible to
recognize the swings of the ideological pendulum
governing the long-standing opposition between the
demands of the international order and the democratic
demands of each country, which are plainly revealed
in monetary policies. Until the First World War, the
dominant ideologies, together with the weakness of
workers’ parties and restrictions on the voting franchise,
meant that the former demands prevailed over the latter,
particularly as trade increased under the influence of the
British Empire. The central objective of the gold
standard was to underpin monetary convertibility in the
most draconian way, with the costs being met by deficit
countries.1 Accordingly, governments and central banks
used unpopular measures to combat balance-of-
payments deficits, deflating economies by raising
interest rates and reducing the money supply; i.e.,
depressing development, imports and prices.2
Subsequently, the devastating repercussions of the
great crisis of the 1930s, universal suffrage and the rise
of social democratic parties upset political balances and
economic paradigms. Citizens increased their sovereign
power over the course of national life, colonialism
disappeared, the rising spiral of international trade was
broken and economies grew as never before. Keynesian
policies and the Second World War brought the world
out of depression and guided the logic of national
strategies, to the point where the State was held
responsible for full employment and growth in each
country.
As a result, the currency system of the gold
standard collapsed and the regulatory power of central
banks was weakened; countries raised barriers to trade
and capital flows. In the international order, existing
agreements were wound up and the so-called Bretton
Woods institutions were created. There arose a new
monetary/currency regime that, unlike the previous
1
 See Bloomfield (1959) and Eichengreen (1996a).
2
 Besides representing a government commitment to the prevention
or limitation of currency fluctuations, fixed parities serve as a
nominal anchor for productive agents’ operations and expectations
about the behaviour of monetary policy.
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one, did not stipulate fixed exchange rates. Instead,
these could be revised whenever a country could show
that it was suffering from a fundamental imbalance and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) accepted this.
The IMF itself provided some balance-of-payments
financing and permitted national controls on capital
movements and, in practice, on trade in goods and
services as well.
The system that came out of Bretton Woods
reflected political changes that had made it unviable
to use deflation in deficit countries as the only way of
correcting payment imbalances, and that had opened
the way for the most intense period of world economic
development in history, particularly in peripheral areas.
Parities could be adjusted to eliminate external deficits
at lower cost to the country concerned. In turn, controls
made it possible to avoid the effects of sudden or
speculative capital movements and moderate the build-
up of adverse trade balances.
Nonetheless, the agreement only allowed parities
to be altered when serious imbalances existed and were
recognized by IMF, which reduced exchange-rate
flexibility in practice. Before acknowledging an
imperative need for devaluation, before admitting that
monetary policy had failed, governments and central
banks strove to keep the exchange rate unaltered,
heightening the opposition between external adjustment
and national development goals. For this purpose, they
had instruments available to them for increasing
protection (tariffs, import permits, etc.) and correcting
payment imbalances, at least temporarily.
Meanwhile, under pressure from the United
States, the Bretton Woods system sought to re-establish
monetary convertibility as a prerequisite for strong
growth in international trade. A failed attempt was
made to do this with the pound sterling (1947) by
means of the Havana Charter, which sought to create
an international trade organization; progress with the
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) was
initially modest as well, while the creation of the
European Payments Union (1950-1958) was regional
rather than multilateral in its approach.
These early efforts foreshadowed, however, the
beginning of another swing in the pendulum, away
from nationalism and back towards cosmopolitanism.
To begin with, attempts to reintroduce universal
monetary convertibility came up against conflicts of
interest among the developed countries. The European
nations, devastated by war, stood out against trade
liberalization; to rectify their balance-of-payments
situations they would need substantial currency
devaluations which would damage the living standards
of their populations without fully alleviating the
constraints on their production and export capacities
(in 1947 Europe had a combined deficit of US$ 7.5
billion).3 For its part, the United States believed that
convertibility was indispensable to create a climate of
fair competition for its exports. To help solve the
problem, the United States Government agreed to
provide substantially greater financing to Europe under
the Marshall Plan and other arrangements.
Between 1959 and 1961 the European countries
restored current-account convertibility, but left capital-
account controls in place. The monetary policy
pendulum continued to swing away from economic
nationalism as the interests of countries in the
developed world became more and more convergent,
although not all the difficulties disappeared and new
problems arose.
From then on, as the payment imbalances of
Europe and Japan were corrected and trade, investment
flows and the operations of international firms all
increased, the number and power of private-sector
actors on the world stage multiplied, while the
influence of national governments waned accordingly.
Countries began to restore convertibility for
transactions on the balance-of-payments current
account, making it harder and harder to apply effective
capital-account controls, until these too were
dismantled in most countries.
From the 1960s onward, Europe and Japan grew
and increased their trade, becoming attractive
destinations for foreign investment, while the United
States began to display persistent trade imbalances.4
Paradoxically, the dollar was consolidating its position
as a reserve currency just as the disequilibria in the
United States balance of payments were increasing,
creating the danger that the country might decide to
relinquish gold-dollar convertibility, thus provoking
serious liquidity problems in the world (the Triffin
dilemma)5 and the consequent collapse of the Bretton
Woods currency system.
3
 In 1949 the European countries devalued their currencies by about
30% yet were still unable to remove import controls. The way was
thereby opened, however, to a solution of their balance-of-payments
problems (see Eichengreen, 1996a, p. 98).
4
 As early as 1960 the United States balance of payments was
displaying weaknesses that would be considerably accentuated by
spending on the Vietnam War and the Great Society projects
implemented at the same time.
5
 See Triffin (1960).
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The post-war monetary system, which rested on the
commitment of the United States to upholding the fixed
price of gold, was eroded not only by the risks
stemming from cumulative United States deficits, but
also by the fact that central banks kept most of their
reserves in dollars. In 1971, with its reserves shrinking
rapidly and the alternative solution of deflating the
economy ruled out, the United States abandoned its
commitment to the unlimited sale of gold at a price of
35 dollars an ounce, bringing down the Bretton Woods
currency regime. Subsequently a variety of currency
regimes were tried, but these gradually moved towards
the extremes of more or less free flotation on the one
hand and fixed parities on the other,6 creating in the
process serious currency misalignments between
countries, speculative movements, volatility and
contagion that are far from having been rectified.
These developments returned the main
responsibility for anchoring the world monetary system
to national authorities, closely supervised by the
multilateral organizations (World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization). For
governments to adopt roles analogous to those they had
under the gold standard entails costs, since meeting the
standards and requirements of the international order
means adopting policies and overruling objections in
defiance of the popular will. Furthermore, there are
asymmetries in the way the international rules are
observed: they are inflexible for the developing world,
even in the case of emerging countries, and lax for the
developed nations, as is shown by the size of United
States external payment imbalances and by government
deficits that now stand at between 4% and 8% of GDP
in Europe, Japan and the United States.7
In the last three decades an undeniable paradox
has arisen. While in theory countries are free to choose
the currency regime they want, even one that gives a
maximum of autonomy to their domestic policies, the
international order requires each country to have an
open economy and stable prices to remove risks to
financial and trade flows, the variables with which
hegemonic transnational interests are mainly concerned.
In line with these developments, ideological
paradigms have shifted so that, rather than
development and employment, it is now the control of
inflation that is exalted as the leading social objective.
This way of thinking has meant that national
governments and their institutions are routinely
suspected of seeking political advantage at the expense
of the fundamental macroeconomic balances. There is
ideological mistrust of the behaviour of the State and
full confidence in the markets. Consequently, fiscal
policy is often criticized for inducing spending that is
too high for the natural rate of growth or employment.
The criterion of budgetary balance is embraced in all
circumstances, i.e., there has been an implicit renunciation
of the use of fiscal measures for developmental or
counter-cyclical purposes.
In the sphere of monetary policy, the new approach
extends not only to policy design, but to the design of
institutions as well. The postmodern view of central
banking emphasizes the need to solve what are known
as “time-inconsistency” problems, i.e., the inconsistency
that arises when governments announce anti-inflation
policies and then act against them in pursuit of political
or electoral gains that economic theory usually assumes
to be transitory. The real or imagined discredit into
which governments have fallen has resulted in central
banks being made independent so that they can pursue
price stabilization objectives without political
contamination.8 External credibility is put first.
6
 The systems tried have ranged from dollarization and currency
boards, exchange rates fixed against a particular currency or basket
of currencies, fixed or adjustable bands and crawling pegs to
managed and free floats, among others. See Mussa and others (2000),
Cartens and Werner (1999) and Ibarra and Moreno-Brid (2001).
Fixed exchange-rate regimes have gradually become fewer. They
are generally adopted by economies that are either small or
integrating (like those of Europe) or have chosen the path of
dollarization. See Eichengreen and Freden (1998), Obstfeld (1997),
Ibarra and Moreno-Brid (2001) and Hauke and Schuler (1993).
7
 The fiscal deficits of the emerging and developing countries now
average 3% of output (1.5% in Mexico), while in the advanced
nations they average 4% (United States 5.9%, Japan 8.2%, Germany
4%, France 4.1%). The data are from IMF (2004).
8
 Although governments can produce monetary and inflationary
surprises, these efforts will fail, argues the theory, if economic agents
anticipate them, so that the result will be more inflation without
positive effects for development (see Barro and Gordon, 1983, pp.
101-121). More general or detailed approaches can be found in
Rogoff (1985, pp. 1169-1190), Giavazzi and Pagano (1988, pp.
1055-1082) and Bernhard and others (2002, pp. 693-723).
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Even so, the fact that central banks have less
intrinsic credibility in a floating regime means that a
complementary fiscal policy anchor is required in the
form of a commitment to reducing budget deficits and
ensuring that any spending growth is financed from
taxes or through open market operations (deferred
taxes) that balance out its monetary impact. Fiscal
accounts in balance or surplus, independent central
banks and the abolition of industrial policies represent
a most impressive surrender of economic sovereignty
by the Latin American countries, which some of them
have taken or been prepared to take to the extreme of
abolishing their national currencies, i.e., dollarization
(or the creation of so-called currency boards), even in
the absence of institutions and agreements for mutual
support and participation in the design of joint
economic policies, like those of the European Union.
If these processes continued, the ultimate outcome
would be monetary or economic unions in which the
costs would be borne asymmetrically not by the
dominant country, but by its periphery.
In short, the use of a combined fiscal and
monetary anchor is an approach which is calculated to
win external credibility for government anti-inflation
policies, but which severely reduces the room for
manoeuvre of domestic public policies and gives than
a markedly procyclical and undemocratic character. In
other words, it represents an effort to bear down on
price and interest-rate differences between countries by
means of deflation until these variables match those of
the leading countries, ignoring the different institutional
arrangements and configurations of political forces in
each nation.
In this swing back of the monetary pendulum,
however, there is one difference from the earlier gold
standard. Previously, recessionary policies were
implemented as imbalances arose; now they are
introduced pre-emptively, condemning many
peripheral countries to a kind of chronic near-
stagnation that prevents them from resolving the
structural failings underlying payment imbalances. The
monetary dilemma then comes down to the opposition
between external credibility and democratic domestic
scrutiny of public policies.
When it comes to currencies, the aspects
emphasized by the economic paradigms have shifted
with the new circumstances. In the 1990s the debate
about the problem of crises moved away from methods
of avoiding high and growing imbalances in the current
account and unsustainable capital flows, or ideas about
the comparative flexibility of prices, wages and interest
rates, always with national objectives of growth and
employment in mind. The analytical focus of anti-crisis
policy now centres on how to maintain and increase
international capital flows, while underlying this is the
objective of price stabilization in economies. Thus,
governments are no longer seeking room for monetary
manoeuvre to pursue developmental goals, but have
sacrificed monetary policy independence almost
entirely to the demands of globalization.9
IV
The Mexican response
Mexico is no exception. The independence granted to
the Bank of Mexico by a 1993 law sets it the single or
overriding objective of combating inflation, while
constraining lending to the government. As in other
cases, it is unclear whether institutional independence
extends only to the use of monetary instruments or
includes the unilateral power to set goals of national
scope that might differ from or even contradict those
of the government and legislature themselves.
Certainly, our recent and not-so-recent history
contains instances of governments using and abusing
monetary and exchange-rate policy to avoid the
political sacrifices involved in prompt action to achieve
an indispensable economic adjustment. But the history
of the Bank of Mexico and its trusts also contains
successes: by channelling private- and public-sector
9
 Summers argues that the prerequisites for reducing the risk of
financial and currency crises concern the capital account of the
balance of payments, while he makes no mention of current-account
problems, treating them as subordinate to the former. According to
this way of thinking, foreign investment and lending play a leading
role in the developing world, despite the volatility of such flows.
These prerequisites are as follows: i) to maintain or create a strong
financial system (well-capitalized and well-supervised banks,
effective corporate governance codes, the rule of law, contract
protection) that can make substantial debt build-ups sustainable; ii)
to adopt a fixed-rate or free-floating currency regime to facilitate access
to capital markets; iii) to have a stable macroeconomic climate that
minimizes monetary and fiscal risks; iv) to build up reserves in
proportion to the country’s liabilities (see Summers, 2000, pp. 1-16).
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do with development objectives as such. Mexico
traditionally used fixed dollar-linked exchange rates as
an anchor for monetary policy and, in general, for all
public policies. The importance of this function was
not minor: it provided certainty in a country where a
hegemonic party ran a semi-authoritarian government
whose decisions and actions were often opaque to the
outside world, to economic agents and to citizens. Until
the late 1980s the annual report of the President to
Congress was almost the only document which, besides
dwelling on government achievements, gave a clue to
changes of economic and political direction. Here the
amount of international reserves was stated and the
information asymmetries between the government on
the one hand, and political parties and citizens on the
other, were partially remedied. However, trade and
financial liberalization left the Mexican economy
defenceless in the face of unrestricted —and not always
stabilizing— capital and goods flows, and of contagion
from external crises.12 From the national policy
perspective, meanwhile, it was and is desirable to avoid
the devaluation crises that have tended to occur every six
years, chiefly owing to the build-up of price differences
with the outside world and their consequences in the form
of trade deficits or unserviceable debts. Flotation provides
an escape route for both problems, but demands greater
monetary and fiscal rigour and greater sacrifices of
growth if the goal of reducing price pressures (whether
originating in the real economy or in problems of
credibility) and bringing domestic inflation closer to
the United States level is to be met.
Nor does flotation resolve all possible excesses in
public policies, although it may well change their
direction. The incentives have now been reversed: the
temptation for independent central banks is not so
much to facilitate economic expansion, whether
sustainable or unsustainable, as to raise interest rates
more than necessary or allow the currency to become
overvalued to win a temporary and costly advantage
in the fight against inflation, their sole or main
responsibility. The lower growth that results reduces
the incentive to invest, innovate and improve
competitiveness, while the higher costs thus artificially
generated for domestic producers make it easier for
them to be displaced by foreign suppliers,13 increasing
funds into new production capacity (along with the
development banks), they paved the way for the period
of most rapid growth in the country’s history, lasting
from 1940 until 1980.10
Capital-account liberalization exposed the country
to volatility, particularly where short-term capital flows
were concerned.11 Sharp movements in the values of
the main international currencies (euro, dollar, yen) and
recent instances of financial contagion show that
developing countries are unlikely to find shelter from
destabilizing financial movements when these arise in
a globalized economy.
In our case, furthermore, inflation was combated
with interest rates that were high by international
standards, creating incentives for outside investors to
bring in short-term funds that remained in the country
only so long as expectations of devaluation did not
increase. The resultant overvaluation of the currency
can be combated only by costly sterilization measures
and reserve build-ups, while there is also an inherent
risk that capital inflows might dry up or even be
abruptly reversed, as happened between 1994 and
1995. This tendency towards overvaluation intensified
in the 1990s as foreign investors bought into numerous
public- and private-sector companies, giving rise to
large currency inflows that were not used to
significantly increase production or export capacity.
The outcome has been a deflationary adjustment
process that has been successful in bringing Mexican
inflation down towards United States levels. The
historical price paid has been an overvalued currency,
which has undermined the competitiveness of domestic
producers, and a retreat from the strategy of outward-
oriented growth and consequent failure to capitalize on
demand in international markets.
Abandonment of the fixed parity regime was due,
then, to two central factors that perhaps have little to
10
 In addition to the cajones crediticios, which lent to activities
deemed to be of priority, the main providers of funding were the
Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación con la Agricultura (agriculture
trusts) (FIRA), the Fondo de Fomento de las Exportaciones de Pro-
ductos Manufacturados (manufacturing export promotion fund), the
Fondo de Equipamiento Industrial (industrial equipment fund)
(FONEI), the Fondo de Operación y Financiamiento Bancario de la
Vivienda (housing operation and bank financing fund) (FOVI), the
Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo (national tourism
development fund) (FONATUR) and the Fondo para el Desarrollo
Comercial (business development fund) (FIDEC).
11
 The advantages or disadvantages of capital-account opening have
been the subject of intense international debate; leading critics
include Tobin, Bhagwati and Rodrik. See Ul Haq, Kaul and
Grunberg (1996), Bhagwati (1998) and Rodrik (1998).
12
 See Garber and Svensson (1995, pp. 1865-1912), Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2002, pp. 503-535), Bergsten and Williamson (2003) and
Eichengreen (1996b).
13
 See Ibarra (1999, pp. 139-160 and 2001, pp. 259-280). See also
Villarreal (2003).
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import dependency. Thus the circle of stabilizing
stagnation is closed, as development incentives are
repeatedly reduced and the competitive position of
domestic companies in outside markets worsens.
Despite a degree of correction recently, the peso
has been almost systematically overvalued between
devaluation crises. Although this temporarily reduces
inflationary pressures, it damages domestic producers.
This is one of the factors accounting for the loss of
external markets and for trade deficits averaging some
US$ 9 billion, while Latin America as a whole is in
surplus (US$ 27 billion in 2003).14 By contrast, China,
Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan province of
China have deliberately kept their currencies
undervalued to bolster their export trade by means of
direct interventions in the currency markets, even
where this has contravened IMF rules.15
Fiscal policy completes the anti-inflationary
anchor of monetary management by deliberately
keeping fiscal deficits below the developing-country
average16 and reducing public spending automatically,
by law, whenever government revenues fall,
irrespective of the position of the economy in the
business cycle.
14
 The figures are from ECLAC (2003).
15
 The reserves of these four countries now total more than US$ 1.7
trillion, clear evidence of the enormous currency misalignments in
the world and of the need to reconstruct the monetary architecture
of the world order (see Bergsten, 2004).
16
 See the figures in note 7.
V
Conclusion
To sum up, the country has been drawn into a strategic
vacuum that is relegating it to permanent near-
stagnation or to a position in the rear of the
international development process. The old is not
working, and the new cannot be made to work. On the
one hand, market and financial opening, the
intensification of world technological change and the
new forms of economic hegemony have made
protectionist strategies anachronistic and unviable. On
the other, the anti-inflationary obsession of
cosmopolitan globalizers has resulted in our case in
policies that are undermining the outward-oriented
growth strategy. The use of high interest rates, an
overvalued currency and balanced budgets (not just in
the current account but in the capital account as well)
as stabilization tools is confronting Mexican producers,
directly and indirectly, with the Herculean task of not
only making up the historical lead enjoyed by the
world’s best producers, but of doing so under the
artificial constraint of an economic policy that is
reducing their competitiveness.
This strategic vacuum has effects not only in
periods of deflation themselves, when the aim is to
bring price rises down to international levels, but well
beyond them. The resultant deficits in human capital
formation, physical investment, technological
modernization and participation in transnational
production and trade networks often prove, over long
years, to be difficult or impossible to make up.
Achieving balance in social goals and their reflection
of public policies is, unquestionably, the crucial
unfulfilled task of national policy.
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